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Note
Right to Privacy: Social Interest and Legal Right
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the late nineteenth century an individual's privacy
was protected by means of legal fictions derived from the laws
of property, contracts, and defamation, although there was no
independent recognition of a tort action protecting one's right to
be let alone.' The subsequent rise of questionable commercial,
governmental, and social practices, coupled with advances in
modern technology,2 however, led some jurisdictions to provide
legal protection of an individual's right to privacy apart from
other legal interests.3  Because these encroachments on what
has been termed "the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men" 4 are certain to continue and be-
come more serious, the purposes of this Note are to explain the
nature of the social interest requiring legal protection, to deter-
mine whether existing law concerning privacy provides ade-
quate protection for this interest, and to suggest an approach
1. COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
2. For illustrations of the advances made with respect to elec-
tronic bugging devices and other such equipment, see, e.g., Jones, How
To Be Atone, Science Digest, April, 1966, p. 20; (bug proof conference
room); Neary, The Big Snoop, Life, May 20, 1966, p. 38.
3. See generally BRENTON, THE PRIVAcY INVADERS (1964); DASH,
KNOWLTON & ScHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959); PAcKARD, THE NAKED
SoctETY (1964); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Use of Poly-
graphs as "Lie Detectors" by the Federal Government of the House
Committee on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1964).
Packard has offered the following hypothetical family situation as
indicative of the status of privacy at the present time. The mother,
while trying on a dress in a department store, is watched by a hidden
close circuit T.V. installed by the store to prevent shoplifting. The
father, while attending a business meeting, is being evaluated by a com-
pany spy planted in the meeting by the president. At the same time
he is himself investigating the credit condition of others, and within a
few hours he will have records showing their life histories, former em-
ployments, residences, family background, and very complete estimates
of their past, present, and future financial status. Their son, at this
time, is being given a polygraph and personality inventory test as a
prerequisite for employment. The results will reveal to a stranger in-
formation of which he himself was not even conscious. These same
prospective employers have already interviewed his associates and
teachers concerning his political opinions. Finally, their daughter, a
sophomore in high school, is completing a 250 item questionnaire which
will analyze her family and sexual adjustment, to allow the school bet-
ter to understand her. Id. at 3-4.
4. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
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which will protect and promote this underlying social interest
more effectively.5
11. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AS A SOCIAL INTEREST
An individual's wish for privacy is generally recognized to be
a legitimate social interest.6 However, since this social value has
not lent itself to meaningful or precise definition, courts, legis-
lators, and commentators have failed to fully comprehend the
ends which the invasion of privacy tort should attempt to serve.7
Thus, before there can be an effective body of tort law to protect
privacy, the social interest which underlies social respect for
individual privacy must be clearly understood.8
The basis underlying the right of privacy is a recognition of
the concept of man's individuality and human dignity. As sum-
marized by Professor Bloustein:
The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life
among others and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or
gratification is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived of
his individuality and human dignity. Such an individual merges
with the mass.... Such a being, although sentient, is fungi-
ble; he is not an individual.
The conception of man embodied in our tradition and in-
corporated in the constitution stands at odds to such human
fungibility. And our law of privacy attempts to preserve indi-
viduality by placing sanctions upon outrageous or unreasonable
violations of the conditions of its sustenance.9
5. The purely psychological, social, and political aspects of the
privacy concept will not be considered, except as they may bear on the
tort of invasion of privacy. For a consideration of these nonlegal as-
pects, see generally AarqDT, THE HumAN CoNi'Tiox (1958); HOFFER, THE
TRuE BELIEVER: THOUGHTS ON THE NATURE or MAss MovEVIENTS (1951);
ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
Further, this Note will not deal primarily with the constitutional
right of privacy. For information regarding the constitutional aspects of
privacy, see The Supreme Court Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 162 (1965);
Symposium, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 197 (1965).
6. Pound, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Right to Privacy,
13 W. REs. L. REv. 34, 35 (1961).
7. It has been said that the right of privacy is: "More subjective
even than 'liberty' and 'justice,' [and] the 'privacy' idea overlaps both,
and even turns back on itself to create internal contradictions . .."
Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charters for an Expanded
Law of Privacy? 64 MIcH. L. REV. 197 (1965).
8. The Greeks viewed privacy as inconsistent with their theory of
active participation in the community. In contrast, it seems no society
has placed more importance upon privacy than American frontier soci-
ety of the nineteenth century. Id. at 202-05. See generally SABINE, A
HISTORY OF POLITIcAL THEORY (rev. ed. 1950); Konvitz, Privacy and the
Law: A Philosophical Prelude, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 272 (1966).
9. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer
to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962, 1003 (1964).
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Aside from fostering human dignity, this approach improves and
advances society by encouraging creativity and differentiation
which prevents stagnation though uniformity.
Since the potential for intrusions upon an individual's pri-
vacy has rapidly multiplied, a denial of adequate legal protec-
tion for this independent right must be construed as an invitation
for others to intrude even more "with complete immunity, and
without regard to the hurt done to the sensibilities of the in-
dividuals whose private affairs might be exploited."' 0 There-
fore, to best advance these complementary social values-the
protection of individual dignity, and social improvement and
advancement-the law should effectively safeguard an individ-
ual's privacy. Recognizing that, as a practical matter, only the
hermit living totally outside the bounds of society can exercise
an unqualified right to be let alone, the demands of our present
society necessarily must encroach to some degree upon the de-
sires for privacy held by its members. The problem thus be-
comes one of harmonizing this legitimate right to privacy with
competing interests of other individuals and of society. Ulti-
mately, the balance must depend upon whether privacy, as a
social interest, is considered an "intrinsic" or "derivative" right.
If privacy is an intrinsic right-a basic right in itself, akin to a
natural right requiring no utilitarian justification-it must be
given greater respect than a right which is viewed as merely
derivative-remaining after all other interests have been satis-
fied. It is submitted that the intrinsic view of the social interest
regarding privacy is more consistent with the "totality of the
constitutional scheme under which we live.""
III. THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LEGAL RIGHT
OF PRIVACY
Some legal commentators have viewed the invasion of pri-
vacy tort as having originated in an early article authored by
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis.12 While it may be
10. Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 504, 113 P.2d 438,
447 (1941).
11. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (freedom
from conviction relationship to privacy); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (privacy concept in fourth and fifth amendments).
But see Davis, What Do We Mean by the Right to Privacy? 4 S.D.L. REV.
1 (1959); Kalvin, Privacy 17i Tort Law-Were Wdrren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 326 (1966).
12. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 I-HAv. L. REV. 193
(1890) (hereinafter cited both the text and footnotes as Warren-
Brandeis).
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true that prior to the Warren-Brandeis article no jurisdiction in
England or this country expressly provided for an independent
cause of action protecting one's privacy, a number of early cases,
understandable only in terms of judicial conservatism, utilized
recognized legal principles as fictions in protecting privacy.
13
Most commonly employed for this purpose were concepts derived
from property, contracts, and defamation.
In Prince Albert v. Strange14 the plaintiff was granted an
injunction to prevent unauthorized reproduction of etchings
made solely for his private enjoyment. While the decision spoke
in terms of literary or artistic property, primary emphasis was
placed upon a broader right-the right of privacy.'5  The social
interest involved was the plaintiff's privacy manifested in seclu-
sion of thought and work, which is distinguishable from those
interests normally involved in copyright and property law. To
protect the latter, the law attempts to secure the profits derived
from an unauthorized publication, while to protect the former,
the law attempts to prevent unwarranted interference in private
matters. The landmark decision of Roberson v. Rochester Fold-
ing Box Co.,' 6 which denied relief under facts indistinguishable
from the Prince Albert case, failed to recognize this distinction.
Because the court became entangled in property concepts, it
failed to grasp the interest of privacy which Prince Albert ac-
tually served.' 7
Other courts have protected privacy by straining the con-
cepts of implied contracts or trusts. In Pollard v. Photographic
13. See, e.g., Bloustein, supra note 9; Warren-Brandeis, supra note
12, at 219-20. "It is certain every man has a right to keep his own
sentiments, if he pleases: he has certainly a right to judge whether he
will make them public, or commit them only to the sight of his friends."
fillar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2302, 2379, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 242 (K.B. 1769).
14. 2 De G. & Sm. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849).
15. The question, however, does not turn upon the form or
amount of mischief or advantage, loss or gain. The author of
manuscripts, whether he is famous or obscure, low or high, has
a right to say of them, if innocent, that, whether interesting or
dull, light or heavy, saleable or unsaleable, they shall not, with-
out his consent, be published.
Id. at 694, 64 Eng. Rep. at 311.
16. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). The defendant had repro-
duced the plaintiff's picture to advertise his product without obtaining
her consent.
17. The Roberson majority read Prince Albert literally. They
argued that the injunction was granted because of the defendant's
breach of trust and interference with the plaintiff's property interests.
They concluded that the opinion manifested no right of privacy. Id. at
548, 64 N.E. at 444.
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Co.,' 8 the defendant, who was authorized to take the plaintiff's
picture, was ordered not to exhibit or sell it without the express
consent of the plaintiff, except as provided by the express or
implied terms of the underlying employment agreement. In
spite of the court's reasoning, 9 the result was to protect the
plaintiff's privacy, whereas a contrary rule would have resulted
in intolerable abuses and surreptitious appropriations of that
privacy.20 This legal fiction, however, is workable only if there
is an agreement to which a court can engraft a term or if there
is an appropriate relationship to support such a trust. Obvi-
ously, since modern methods of invading privacy can avoid
creating any direct relationship whatsoever with an aggrieved
party, this approach is at best a haphazard way to protect privacy.
In Byron v. Johnson,2 1 the plaintiff successfully enjoined
circulation by the defendant of an inferior poem falsely attrib-
uted to his pen. Since the defendant's acts were clearly damag-
ing to his artistic reputation, the plaintiff probably had an action
for libel. This case illustrates how many courts were able to
protect an individual's privacy simply by ignoring the legal dis-
tinctions between two separate interests-that of reputation and
that of privacy22-and were able to conclude that they were
granting relief from defamatory conduct, while actually vindicat-
ing the right to privacy.
In 1881, the first important American decision, De May v.
Roberts,2 3 held that a person lacking a legitimate purpose or
interest who intrudes into another's privacy, such as at child-
birth, is legally liable for a violation of an independent right of
privacy. The Michigan court, without reference to the law of
property, contracts, or defamation, concluded:
It would be shocking to our sense of right, justice and propri-
18. [1888] C.D. 345.
19. The court seemingly relied upon the conclusion that the defend-
ant's conduct constituted a breach of an implied term of the contract
and a breach of trust.
20. The Roberson court was of the opinion that Pollard was not
valid precedent, despite language in that opinion that the existence of
property was immaterial to the issue of granting the injunction. There
is, however, no clear justification given for this rejection outside of mis-
placed reliance upon the legal fictions found in the Pollard opinion. 171
N.Y. 538, 548, 64 N.E. 442, 444 (1902).
21. 2 Mer. 29, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (1816).
22. "The fundamental difference between a right to privacy and a
right to freedom from defamation is that the former directly concerns
one's own peace of mind, while the latter concerns primarily one's rep-
utation." Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass.
4, 57, 27 N.E.2d 753, 755 (1940).
23. 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881).
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ety to doubt even but that for such an act the law would afford
an ample remedy. To the plaintiff the occasion was a most
sacred one and no one had a right -to intrude unless invited or
because of some real and pressing necessity .... The plaintiff
had a legal right to privacy .... 24
This decision's value is limited, since the Warren-Brandeis arti-
cle's extensive review of the common law origins of this right
made no mention of it, and the same jurisdiction failed to men-
tion De May in a later decision which denied an independent
right of privacy.
25
By 1890, because numerous sociological and technological
changes had taken place, an individual was no longer able to
protect his privacy without legal support. The resulting momen-
tum for a right of privacy motivated the Warren-Brandeis article.
At first, their theories met with little favor from either com-
mentators 26 or courts, 27 as is most clearly illustrated by the
right's evolution in New York, the first jurisdiction to consider
seriously the right of privacy as an independent cause of action.
New York's lower courts had frequently allowed such an
action,28 but in Roberson the court of appeals rejected the plain-
tiff's contention that unauthorized use of her likeness on the
defendant's product constituted an actionable invasion of pri-
vacy. The majority of a closely divided court "9 reasoned that
such a tort action could not be recognized because of the subjec-
24. Id. at 165, 9 N.W. at 148-49.
25. In Atkinson v. John E. Doherty Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285
(1899), the court apparently reversed its position and expressly denied
the existence of a separate tort to protect the right of privacy. Argua-
bly, the two cases are distinguishable. In Atkinson the court held that
the facts did not constitute an unreasonable intrusion, for the defendant
had merely exhibited a nondefamatory picture of the plaintiff, while
in De May the invasion was so objectionable that relief was compelled.
Moreover, in the latter case no other legal relief was available, while
in the former, the court was of the view that the laws of defamation
were adequate to provide a remedy if one were necessary.
26. See, e.g., Lisle, The Right of Privacy (A Contra View), 19 Ky.
L.J. 137 (1931); O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 CoLum. L. REv. 437
(1902).
27. See, e.g., Atkinson v. John E. Doherty Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80
N.W. 285 (1899); Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.L 13, 73 Atl. 97 (1909).
28. The first known decision recognizing a separate right to privacy
was an unrecorded trial judge's opinion, Manola v. Stevens, N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1890, reported in the N.Y. Times, June 15, 1890, p. 1, N.Y. Times,
June 21, 1890, p. 2. For recorded opinions, see, e.g., Schuyler v. Curtis,
147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22 (1895); Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 26 N.Y.
Supp. 908 (Super. Ct. 1893).
29. This four to three split created such controversy that one of
the concurring justices felt compelled to take the unprecedented action
of publishing a law review article in defense of the decision. O'Brien,
supra note 26.
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tive nature of the alleged injury, the fear of opening "the flood-
gates of litigation," the difficulty of distinguishing between pub-
lic and private persons and subjects, and the desire not to in-
fringe upon the conflicting interest of free expression.
In a well reasoned dissent,30 Justice Gray expanded the
Warren-Brandeis thesis, concluding that "the individual has al-
ways been entitled to be protected in the exclusive use and en-
joyment of that which is his own."31  Inherent in the dissent
was the idea that the plaintiff had been wronged, and that only
separate recognition of the right of privacy could provide ade-
quate relief, since the legal fictions employed in the past could
not be extended to cover the facts then before the court.32 Thus,
the Roberson situation was distinguishable from the common
law cases on the very grounds which compelled the De May
court to grant relief-the inability of recognized legal concepts to
be stretched to grant adequate relief in privacy cases. Finally,
despite the absence of direct precedent and legal commentary
supporting its position, the minority recognized that as the prog-
ress of civilization creates new conditions and problems, princi-
ples of natural justice are necessarily manifested as new princi-
ples of the common law.33
The New York legislature quickly reacted to the social inter-
est left unprotected by the Roberson decision. It recognized the
right of privacy by making it both a tort and a misdemeanor to
take another's name or likeness without authorization for "ad-
vertising purposes, or for .the purposes of trade. . . .,$4 Despite
the apparent narrowness of the statutes, the New York courts
have been willing to liberally construe them to handle privacy
30. 171 N.Y. 538, 557, 64 N.E. 442, 448 (1902).
31. Id. at 561, 64 N.E. at 449.
32. The dissent seemed to recognize that no definition of defamation
would cover the facts there involved. Neither was there any basis for
creating a contract. The court might have argued that the defendant
had been benefited, at least negatively, in that he did not have to pay
a model to pose. The problem with this approach is that it may not
adequately compensate for the injury incurred. Therefore, the situation
was that, while there existed a violation of the plaintiff's right of privacy,
without express recognition of this right no remedy could be granted.
33. Id. at 561, 64 N.E. at 449.
The minority went on to point out that equity recognition brings the
law into balance with social needs, and that in judicial evolution it suc-
ceeds legal fictions and precedes legislation. Id. at 561-2, 64 N.E. at 449.
See generally MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (3d Ames ed. 1878).
34. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1903, ch. 132, §§ 1-2, as amended, N.Y. Civil
Rights Law §§ 50-51 (1921). See generally HoFSTADRa, THE DvELopam T
Or RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN NEW YORK (1954).
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problems as they arise.8 5
Three years after Roberson, the Georgia Supreme Court, in
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.,3 6 was presented with
essentially the same facts. The Pavesich court, influenced by the
Warren-Brandeis theory, the strong dissent from Roberson, a
reading of the common law cases suggested by the proponents of
the right of privacy, and most importantly, a consideration of
the social interest needing legal protection, gave independent
recognition to an individual's "right to be let alone. '37
The general trend until the 1930's, however, was marked by
a refusal to recognize the invasion of privacy tort.38 Since that
time, over three-fifths of the American jurisdictions have recog-
nized the right to privacy as an interest to be protected by an
independent tort action, either judicially39 or by statute.40 Pres-
ently, only four jurisdictions have yet to take a position on this
question,41 while only four have clearly opposed recognition of
this independent right.4
IV. PRESENT APPROACHES TO THE RIGHT OF
PRIVACY TORT
The Warren-Brandeis article was the first definitive inquiry
into the nature of the interest in privacy and the first attempt
to define the invasion of privacy tort.48 Numerous legal com-
35. See, e.g., Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 327, 221
N.E.2d 543, 544 (1966).
36. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (defendants unauthorizedly used
plaintiff's name and likeness in advertisements).
37. After discussing the judicial conservatism which had been ob-
structing the recognition of this right, the court concluded:
The valuable influence upon society and upon the welfare of the
public of the conservatism of the lawyer . . . cannot be over-
estimated; but this conservatism should not go to the extent of
refusing to recognize a right which the instincts of nature prove
to exist, and which nothing in judicial decision, legal history, or
writing upon the law can be called to demonstrate its nonexist-
ence as a legal right.
Id. at 213, 50 S.E. at 78.
38. See notes 26-27 supra.
39. For a complete compilation of those states which have express-
ly recognized the tort in some form, see PRosssa, TORTS § 112 (3d ed.
1964).
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid. These courts take a position very similar to the Roberson
court and hold that any change in the commoi law must come from the
legislature. E.g., Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956).
43. COOLEY, supra note 1, had considered the right to be let alone,
but for all intents and purposes this article was the beginning.
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mentators and courts have since attempted to clarify and im-
prove upon this statement.44  Three basic approaches, clearly
illustrated in articles by Dean William Prosser,45 Professor Fred-
rick Davis, 40 and Professor Edward Bloustein,47 have been ad-
vanced to guide the courts and legislatures in this area.
A. THE PROSSER APPROACH
Dean Prosser's analysis is presently the most widely ac-
cepted, as evidenced by the fact that in the past decade nearly
every reported case involving issues concerning privacy has al-
luded to this conception of the right to privacy, 4 and that it
will most likely be adopted by the American Law Institute in the
second edition of the Restatement of Torts.49
It is Prosser's position that the right of privacy does not in-
volve a single tort, but rather a collection of four distinct inva-
sions of three independent interests having little in common be-
yond an alleged interference with the right of privacy. The four
distinct invasions involve:
(1) Intrusions upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into
his private affairs.
(2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff.
(3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye.
44. For example, thirteen articles concerning some facet of this
right were published in legal periodicals between September, 1964 and
August, 1965. See INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS (1965).
45. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960). This article was
substantially incorporated into the most recent edition of his hornbook.
PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 39. See also Wade, Defamation and the
Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962).
46. Davis, supra note 11; see Kalvin, supra note 11; Seavey, Can
Texas Courts Protect Newly Discovered Interests? 31 TEXAS L. REV. 308
(1953).
47. Bloustein, supra note 9. See also 1 HA _PER & JAEs, TORTS 677-
86 (1956).
48. See, e.g., Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 176, 132
So. 2d 321, 323 (1961); Carlisle v. Fawcett Publication, Inc., 201 Cal. App.
2d 733, 745, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 413 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); McAndrews v.
Roy, 131 So. 2d 256, 261 (Fla. 1961).
49. Support for this contention is found in the fact that Prosser is
the reporter for this restatement, and Dean Wade, an ardent supporter
of the Prosser position, is one of the advisers. Moreover, Wade has pub-
licly stated:
[T]here is every reason to expect that when the second edition
of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS is completed and adopted by the
American Law Institute, [Dean Prosser's] analysis will be sub-
stituted for the rather generalized treatment now to be found in
section 867.
16 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA CoNmP. 8 (1964).
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(4) Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plain-
tiff's name or likeness.50
The interests protected by these separate torts are inconsistent
and irreconcilable, having nothing in common except being in-
cluded under the same title. The first category protects freedom
from mental distress; 51 the second and third protect reputation;r
2
and the last protects a proprietary interest in one's name or
likeness. 53
Rather than advancing the theory of an independent right of
privacy, it would appear that Prosser's approach merely recog-
nizes the existence of new means to commit the already existing
torts of mental distress, defamation, and misappropriation. If
this is true, there would be no need for the independent tort of
invasion of privacy, since either there is no separate interest
needing such protection, or if a separate interest does exist, it
can be adequately protected within these other principles.
Such a position was expressly denied in the Warren-Brandeis
article which concluded that violation of one's privacy was a
separate, independent wrong beyond mere mental distress or eco-
nomic loss; it was a legal injuria-an act wrongful in itself.54
Therefore, while a particular invasion of privacy may well result
in injury to one's reputation, cause mental distress, or deprive
one of some economic opportunity, each effect constitutes only
an aggravation of the invasion. The injury is actually to the
individual's dignity or "inviolate personality." Thus, Prosser's
categories merely manifest different consequences that may re-
sult from the initial injury. Since Prosser is apparently con-
vinced there should be a separate right, his formulation may be
explained as simply a failure to articulate the underlying inter-
est.
Most important, if the intrinsic interest underlying the right
of privacy were not recognized and Prosser's approach were ac-
cepted, the result would be an inability to reconcile privacy as a
tort concept with the concept found in other legal contexts.
Arguably, the interest served by the constitutional right to pri-
vacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut5 5 or Boyd v. United
States5 6 should be consistent with and reflect that of the right
50. Prosser, supra note 45, at 389.
51. Id. at 392, 422.
52. Id. at 398, 401, 422-23.
53. Id. at 406, 423.
54. Warren-Brandeis at 197-98, 213.
55. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
56. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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of privacy in tort cases. Given Prosser's emphasis, this con-
sistency cannot be achieved, since the underlying interests are
different-the former right protects the "sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life,"57 while the latter protects eco-
nomic security, reputation, or mental stability. The same result
occurs when Prosser's analysis is compared with statutes and
common law rules involving the privacy concept.53 Therefore,
the primary weakness in Prosser's approach is that while it
recognizes that the right to privacy exists, it fails to understand,
or at least to verbalize, the underlying social interest requiring
legal protection-the preservation of each individual's dignity.
Thus, since it does not free the interest served by privacy from
the shackles of law designed to serve entirely different ends,
Prosser's approach leaves the tort of invasion of privacy "still
that of a haystack in a hurricane....
B. THE DAvis APPROACH
Professor Davis concludes that however useful in a sociologi-
cal sense the concept of privacy may be, it need not exist inde-
pendently as a legal concept, since the social interest can best be
protected by increased recognition of mental suffering and/or
expropriation of personality or property.60 The proponents of
this approach are, in effect, reemphasizing the rationale of the
Roberson decision accepted in those jurisdictions rejecting the
tort of invasion of privacy.61 This approach proceeds under the
rationale that the right is too vague and too subjective to create
an adequate basis for relief. The right to privacy is seen as
merely a derivative interest resulting only from the protection
of another more basic interest.0 2 As Davis concluded,
Indeed, one can logically argue that the concept of a right to
privacy was never required in the first place, and that its whole
history is an illustration of how well-meaning but impatient
academicians can upset the normal development of the law by
57. Id. at 630.
58. See notes 68-78 infra and accompanying text.
59. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481,
485 (3d Cir. 1956).
60. Davis, supra note 11, at 18-20. Davis reasoned:
The usefulness of the "right to privacy" as a jural concept can
be more easily calculated if "privacy" is recognized as a condi-
tion or state achieved when other more elementary interests are
safeguarded. . . . In other words, "privacy" is an interest or
condition which derives from and is automatically secured by
the protection of more cognizable rights.
Id. at 18.
61. See note 42 supra.
62. See note 60 supra.
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pushing it too hard.63
Thus, according to Davis, the right of privacy becomes little
more than a sociological goal like the "pursuit of happiness."
This approach also suggests that greater clarity will come only
when courts cease to gather diverse and explicit torts under
this nonlegal concept without articulating the actual legal basis
for establishing the legal interests to be balanced or adjusted.
This analysis, even more than Prosser's, fails to realize that
the common law concepts of defamation or property served only
as legal fictions to enable courts to grant relief for invasions of
privacy, an interest which now demands separate recognition.
Moreover, Davis' definition of the social interest assumes that
privacy is not an intrinsic right. It is for this reason that the
Davis approach cannot be reconciled with the concept of privacy
as it is understood in nontort contexts; like Prosser's approach,
it attempts to focus upon and protect substantially different in-
terests. However, the feature of Davis' position which is subject
to the greatest criticism and which clearly distinguishes it from
Prosser's view is its total denial of a legal right to privacy, a
position which should not be maintained in light of increasing
pressures upon privacy.
C. THE BLOUSTEIN APPROACH
In answer to Prosser, Professor Bloustein 64 has taken the
position that in privacy cases "the injury is to our individuality,
to our dignity as individuals, and the legal remedy represents a
social vindication of the human spirit thus threatened rather than
a recompense for the loss suffered."6 5 Based upon this premise,
the invasion of privacy becomes more than merely a new way to
commit an old tort; it becomes a separate and independent tort
action created to protect the individual's "right to be let alone."
This right is an intrinsic interest involving more than property or
reputation and more than a form of mental trauma; it is the
attempted preservation of individual dignity. As a result,
whether the personal information is true, is made public, or has
economic value becomes immaterial.
This approach is consistent with both the underlying social
interest and the Warren-Brandeis attempt to provide needed legal
protection. As Bloustein perceptively indicates,6" this view al-
63. Davis, supra note 11, at 23.
64. Bloustein, supra note 9.
65. Id. at 1003.
66. Id. at 993-1000.
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lows the reconciliation of constitutional law cases such as Gris-
wold6 7 or Silverman v. United States,68 where an eavesdropping
device used to monitor private conversations was condemned,
with other invasions of privacy as found in Melvin v. Reid,69
where unnecessary and unreasonable use of the plaintiff's iden-
tity in a motion picture gave rise to liability. While it is true
that intrusions in the former cases involved state action, and the
intrusions in the latter involved conduct of private parties, the
underlying wrong in both situations was identical-the trans-
gression of a right to privacy emanating "from the totality of
the constitutional scheme under which we live."70
Some jurisdictions have accepted this position and have held
state constitutional provisions similar to the fourth amendment
applicable to actions of private persons.71 Thus, recognition of
the right to privacy by the law of torts forms a penumbra or
zone of privacy, parallel to the constitutional right to privacy,
which protects an individual from unreasonable invasions of his
privacy by other individuals. 72 In Griswold, the Supreme Court
recognized that the ninth amendment prevents government from
unreasonably invading a citizen's retained right of privacy. As
long as the interest lies in securng and protecting rights re-
tained by individual citizens, there is no reason why individuals
in the community should be able to infringe upon others' rights
where the government cannot. In fact, greater justification can
be found for governmental interference, at least where the ulti-
mate beneficiary is society as a whole.
This common underlying interest in privacy can also be
seen in a number of state and federal statutes, ranging from
67. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
68. 365 U.S. 505 (1961). Numerous cases illustrate this principle.
See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452 (1932).
69. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931). Nearly
every privacy case could be used just as easily to illustrate this point,
since they all may be understood in terms of the identical social interest
involved.
70. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (Goldberg, J., con-
curring).
71. See, e.g., Young v. Western & Atl. R.R., 39 Ga. App. 761, 148
S.E. 414 (1929); Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958).
But see Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 144 W. Va. 673, 683, 110 S.E.2d 716,
723 (1959).
72. Support for this proposition may be drawn from the ninth
amendment which provides that certain rights are retained by the indi-
vidual citizens. Arguably, the basic right of privacy is among these re-
tained rights in light of Griswold.
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"peeping tom" statutes8 to the Internal Revenue Code.7 4 Each
of these statutes evidences a desire to protect against degrada-
tion of the individual and his privacy, irrespective of who may
be the intruding party.7 5 Many expressly provide civil as well
as criminal remedies, thereby enlarging the scope of the inter-
est.7 6 Even where both are not expressly provided, courts often
have created civil remedies by using the criminal violation to
define the civil wrong.7 7 This engrafting of civil remedies upon
criminal statutes illustrates that the right to privacy warrants
and requires protection in many forms-civil and criminal-but
the purpose in each situation is to give adequate legal protection
to the underlying social interest. Both the statutes and the com-
mon law tort, in order to serve this end, provide against intru-
sions and disclosures, the alternative forms of injury to the
social interest, thereby "making a man secure in his person, not
only against prying eyes and ears, but against the despair of
being the subject of public scrutiny and knowledge. 78
V. A PROPOSED STANDARD FOR THE INVASION OF
PRIVACY TORT
From Bloustein's acute analysis of the nature of the interest
demanding legal protection-the "inviolate personality" apart
from any consequential injury to reputation, property or mental
state-it follows that the primary focus should be placed upon
what an individual may expect to keep private. Thus, it is sub-
73. E.g., LA. Rnv. STAT. AnN. § 14:284 (1950); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 721;
see WHARTON, CRnvIAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 171 (12th ed. 1932). New
York's laws illustrate numerous other contexts in which privacy has been
protected. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 553-54 (prohibiting disclosure of confiden-
tial information acquired from official activities); N.Y. Soc. WELFARE
LAW §§ 136, 372(4) (prohibiting misuse of information gathered in the
course of duty); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 73(8) (forbidding publication
of interviews taken by state investigatory agencies).
74. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(a)-1 (1961) (prohibiting disclosure of
private matters filed with -tax data). See also Federal Communications
Act, 48 Stat. 110.-04 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1962); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1904-08(1951) (prohibiting disclosure of confidential business information by
federal officials).
75. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer
to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962, 9S5-96 (1964).
76. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-1, -7 (Smith-Hurd 1961); cf. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2443 (1958).
77. See, e.g., Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960), afrd,
365 U.S. 458 (1961); McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga.
App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939). These jurisdictions apparently apply a
negligence per se standard.
78. Bloustein, supra note 75, at 1000,
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mitted that the general standard in any inquiry must be whether
a particular invasion is unwarranted or unreasonable to a man
of ordinary sensibilities.
79
This concept of privacy, just as negligence or due process, is
not necessarily impaired because of the inherent vagueness as
to its identity or limits. Instead, by the employment of these
"general terms with an open textured meaning ... ,,s the judi-
cial process is provided with a much needed flexibility whereby
courts may recognize and protect the social interest with respect
to the particular facts presented in light of changing attitudes.8 '
Whether an intrusion is unwarranted or unreasonable in this
context will, to a large extent, depend upon the conduct of the
complaining party, as well as that of the defendant. If, for ex-
ample, consent is given by the plaintiff to an intrusion into his
privacy, he should be precluded from complaining.8 2 Consent
may be manifested expressly8 3 or by implication from knowl-
edge 84 or conduct.8 5  Thus, where a person has voluntarily
sought public exposure, he should be deemed to have consented
to the invasion of his privacy.86 Once consent is manifested, it
may be revoked at any time prior to the invasion if given
gratuitously; 87 if given for a consideration, it ought to be irre-
79. By this standard it is thought that some objectivity will be
allowed to temper what is clearly a very subjective cause of action. In
this respect, the standard takes on, but should not be confused with,
aspects of the balancing processes in negligence.
80. Christie, Vagueness and Legal Language, 48 MINN. L. REv. 885,
886 (1964).
81. Professor Christie's premise is that vagueness in legal language
frequently permits the law to fulfill its social function. "[V]agueness
is sometimes an indispensible tool for the achievement of accuracy and
precision in language, particularly in legal language. Vagueness in legal
language has also given our law a much needed flexibility." Id. at 911.
See also Williams, Language and the Law-II, 61 L.Q. Rav. 179-81, 189-92
-(1945).
82. E.g., Tanner-Brice Co. v. Sims, 174 Ga. 13, 161 S.E. 819 (1931Y;
Grossman v. Frederick Bros. Artists Corp., 34 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct.
1942).
83. Ibid.
84. E.g., Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 175 Kan. 275, 262 P.2d 808
(1953).
85. E.g., Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441
(1953); Thayer v. Worcester Post Co., 284 Mass. 160, 187 N.E. 292 (1933).
86. E.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942); Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y.
354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952).
87. E.g., Garden v. Parfumerie Rigaud, Inc., 151 Misc. 692, 271
N.Y. Supp. 187 (Sup. Ct. 1933); State ex rel. LaFollette v. Hinkle, 131
Wash. 86, 229 Pac. 317 (1924).
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vocable.8 8 If, however, the actual invasion exceeds the bound-
aries of the consent given, the consent should only mitigate dam-
ages, not preclude liability.8 9
Clearly, not every threat to privacy in the absence of express
or implied consent should be actionable; interaction with others
is inevitable and unavoidable in our crowded communities.90
Thus, while any individual remains a member of society, his
right to privacy must be determined by balancing his expecta-
tions and desires with conflicting social interests.9 1 The most
frequent and important competing interest is the right of free
expression. As pointed out in Barber v. Time, Inc.,92 the right
of privacy is not inconsistent with freedom of expression but
only limits its abuse. Therefore, the difficulty lies in determin-
ing when legitimate public curiosity becomes unscrupulous and
unwarranted.
Consistent with the purpose of the constitutional guarantees
of free speech and press, "the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources," 9 courts
have been hesitant to find the news media liable for violating an
individual's privacy.94 The most recent example is Time, Inc. v.
Hill,95 where the Supreme Court held:
that the constitutional protections for speech and press preclude
the application of [the right of privacy] . . . to redress false
reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that
the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity
or in reckless disregard of the truth.9 6
The thrust of the opinion was that to place sanctions against
less than calculated falsehoods would discourage the press from
88. E.g., Long v. Decca Records, Inc., 76 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup. Ct.
1947).
89. See Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481
(3d Cir. 1956); Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Tullos, 219 F.2d 617 (5th Cir.
1955).
90. This is especially true because of the subjective nature of this
tort; the over-sensitive must expect and accept social interaction. One
court stated the rationale, concluding that "persons living in organized
communities must suffer some damage, annoyance, and inconvenience
from each other. For these they are compensated by all the advantages
,of civilized society." Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 577 (1876). See
also 4 ELLiOTs DEBATES ON T=E FEDERAL CoNsTrrITIoN 571 (1876).91. Pound, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Right to Privacy,
13 W. REs. L. REv. 34, 35-36 (1961).
92. 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
93. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
94. E.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 87 Sup. Ct. 534 (1967); Sidis v. F-R
Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
95. 87 Sup. Ct. 534 (1967).
96. Id. at 542,
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fulfilling its social responsibilities.97
Justice Fortas' dissent,98 while recognizing the importance of
the first amendment concluded:
Difficulty presents itself because . . . [privacy laws] . . . may
impinge upon conflicting rights of those accused of invading the
privacy of others. But this is not automatically a fatal objec-
tion. Particularly where the right of privacy is invaded by
words-by the press or in a book or pamphlet-the most careful
and sensitive appraisal of the total impact of the claimed tort
upon the congeries of rights is required.99
It is submitted that Fortas' position is the more accurate view of
the necessary balance. In the Hill case, the appellee and his
family had been held hostage for nineteen hours by three es-
caped convicts. The family was treated courteously and released
unharmed. Following this experience, the Hills attempted to
avoid publicity and wanted only to return to their normal way
of life. The following year, a novel, The Desperate Hours, de-
picting a family being held hostage was published. Unlike the
Hills' experience, the family was molested, insulted, and humili-
ated by the escaped convicts. Three years later, the novel was
made into a play under the same title. At this point, Life maga-
zine published an article concerning the play, clearly implying
that the Hill family's experience and the play were one and
the same. 10 0
Thus, when the assertions of free speech go beyond the pur-
poses this right is to serve,101 it no longer should operate as a
limiting factor upon the right of privacy. Even where matters
of public interest exist-events which are part of the history of
the community'O2 -it should not be necessary to disclose private
97. Id. at 542-43.
98. Id. at 554. He was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Clark.
99. Id. at 556.
100. This case arose under the New York privacy statute, which
arguably is not really a privacy statute at all. See Oma v. Hillman
Periodicals, Inc., 281 App. Div. 240, 118 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1953); Koussevitz-
ky v. Allen, Towne & Health, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup.
Ct.), affd, 272 App. Div. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1947) (right to publicity).
Nonetheless, the facts do illustrate a prime example for the proposition
that the right to privacy may exist even where first amendment guaran-
tees are involved.
101. See, e.g., Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 253, 37 So. 2d 118, 121
(1948).
102. See, e.g., Norman v. City of Las Vegas, 64 Nev. 38, 177 P.2d 442
(1947); McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq. 24, 43 A.2d 514 (Ch. 1945)
(pre-trial release of plaintiff's prints to rogues' galleries unnecessary
invasion).
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matters prematurely,'10 3 to have them left in the public domain
any longer than is reasonably required,-0 4 or to disclose any more
information than is reasonably necessary. 0 5 Rather, to justify
disclosure, some logical and reasonable connection between the
plaintiff and a matter coming within the meaning of public in-
terest ought to be established, 0 6 and such exposure should be
deemed legitimate only "until [the plaintiff has] . . . reverted
to the lawful and unexciting life led by the great bulk of the
community . "... ,107
Other courts have held that the process which underlies the
first amendment may take many forms other than pure news
reporting, such as publicizing entertainment and amusement, 08
crimes, marriage, and other matters of questionable value but
wide popular appeal. 0 9 The rationale of this view is the fear of
judicial censorship over what the public may read. The wisdom
of extending constitutional protection to these areas in light of
the social interest herein defined seems questionable. A better
approach would be to attempt to balance these competing inter-
ests on a case by case basis.
This problem of competing interests which may limit the
right of privacy has recently come into issue with respect to cer-
tain business and governmental practices which endanger the
103. See, e.g., Wagner v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 307 F.2d 409 (7th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 909 (1963).
104. See, e.g., Martin v. New Metropolitan Fiction, Inc., 139 nisc.
290, 248 N.Y. Supp. 359 (Sup. Ct. 1931); cf. Garner v. Triangle Publica-
tions, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See also Barber v. Time,
Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942) (court emphasized the unnec-
essary use of plaintiff's name); Spiegel, Public Celebrity v. Scandal
Magazine-The Celebrity's Right to Privacy, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 280
(1957).
105. Cf. Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191,
238 P.2d 670 (1951).
106. Compare Delinger v. American News Co., 6 App. Div. 2d 1027,
178 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1958) (physical culturists' picture on book discussing
muscular development), with Martin v. Johnson Publishing Co., 157
N.Y.S.2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (plaintiff's picture on story concerning
"man hungry" women not related).
107. RESTATEME-T, TORTS § 867, comment c (1939).
108. To qualify for first amendment protection, the person or matter
apparently need only possess "that indefinable quality of interest which
attracts public attention." Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746,
747 (E.D.N.Y. 1936). See also Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 143 F.
Supp. 952 (W.D. Pa. 1956), afrd, 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 921 (1958).
109. See, e.g., Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 157 F. Supp. 240
(D. Del. 1957) (robbery); Smith v. National Broadcasting Co., 138 Cal.
App. 2d 807, 292 P.2d 600 (1956) (escaped panther); Aquino v. Bulletin
Co., 190 Pa. Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959) (marriage).
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individual's dignity by the accumulation, and often the unau-
thorized exposure, of personal information." The basic objec-
tions found in this area are that:
First, information out of a personal data file may be disclosed
to an improper person. Second, such information may be false,
or incomplete, or disclosed in a misleading way, so that its
recipient receives a mistaken impression of the subject of the
file."'
Probably the most typical illustration of this increasing problem
is the credit investigation most businesses conduct regarding
customers seeking credit.112 Other examples are the use of
polygraphs and personality profile tests as a prerequisite to
employment or college admittance. While the individual, at least
implicitly, consents to these intrusions, the issue becomes again
a matter of determining where to draw the line between relevant
information necessary to satisfy commercial, governmental, or
social interests and irrelevant data. Since the inquiring party in
all such situations has an advantageous bargaining position, due
to the leverage he can exert, an individual's privacy can be ex-
posed to numerous abuses. Accordingly, the party with this lev-
erage must not be allowed to justify his conduct solely in terms
of consent.
Apart from the initial intrusion, the more serious danger is
the possibility of improper disclosure. The information given in
one context is easily retainable through the use of microfilm or
computer tapes, and common practice seems to permit easy ex-
change of this information among business and governmental
agencies. 113 Perhaps it is in this context that the dangers are
the greatest, and legal protection is most necessary.
Unlike the constitutionally protected freedom of expression,
business and social interests do not appear as compelling when
balanced against the right to privacy. 114 There is here no con-
110. PAcKARD, TnE NAKED SOCiETY ch. 11 (1964). Hearle, A Data
Processing System for State & Local Governments 22 PuB. AnUinm. REV.
146 (1962); Karst, "The Files:" Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and
Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 342
(1966).
111. Karst, supra note 110, at 343.
112. Id. at 371-76. Karst considers the problems inherent in consum-
er credit investigation files in detail.
113. Id. at 342-43.
114. Support for this contention is derived from a reading of cases
not involving the free speech issue. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Vandergriff, 52 Ga. App. 662, 184 S.E. 452 (1936); Burns v. Stevens,
236 Mich. 443, 210 N.W. 482 (1926). In Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.,
53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942), this gray area is
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stitutional guarantee with which privacy must be balanced. In-
stead, the basic right of privacy derived from constitutional prin-
ciples must be balanced against interests lacking this status. In
this light, an understanding of privacy compels stronger sanc-
tions to be placed against business and some governmental in-
vasions.
Thus, under this approach, liability for invasions of privacy
ought to be established, irrespective of the intruding party's in-
tent or negligence. "The invasion . . . is equally complete and
equally injurious, whether the motives . . .are . . . culpable or
not."" 5 Therefore intent is immaterial. Given the primary em-
phasis upon an individual's expectations, the sole consideration
should be whether the conduct in fact amounted to a violation
of privacy." 6
Procedurally, flexibility should be applied. The suggested
rules placing the burden of proof illustrate this goal. Initially,
the claiming party should only be required to establish that the
defendant's behavior constituted an invasion of his privacy. The
burden of proof ought then to shift to the defendant to justify
his conduct in terms of consent or some counter balancing social
interest. Ultimately, the question will be one of fact, but by the
above procedure, the intruder must show the reasonableness of
his invasion.
While the right of privacy requires no new remedies, courts
should realize that one of the purposes of this tort action is to
vindicate the "inviolate personality," not merely to compensate
personal injuries. In this respect a wider use of injunctions may
prove a very effective means of controlling both invasions and
disclosures of one's privacy, without raising the more difficult
questions of damages. Punitive damages should be available
where the defendant's conduct evidences malice with respect to
the intrusion." 7 Finally, in recognizing that an independent in-
terest, which is also found in defamation or some other tort, is
being threatened, there is little reason why a recovery for one
precludes recovery for the others.
clearly illustrated by a type of commercial news found not to be within
the first amendment's protection.
115. Warren-Brandeis at 218.
116. Id. at 218-19. Further, given the recognized underlying interest
and ever increasing pressure being exerted upon that interest, there is
little reason to concern oneself with issues of fault or intent.
117. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 409 (1960). See gener-
ally McCoRMIcK, DAmAGEs §§ 72-128 (1935).
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VI. CONCLUSION
An understanding of the interest underlying the right of
privacy shows that to provide adequate legal protection for this
interest, recognition of a separate tort is necessary. Moreover,
such recognition will allow other theories of law previously re-
lied upon to protect this interest to develop more consistently
with the ends with which they are primarily concerned. No-
where is this more clearly illustrated than in the relationship
defamation has had to the evolution of the invasion of privacy
tort. Although it has been suggested that the right of privacy is
merely an extension of defamation, designed to avoid its en-
grafted difficulties, ultimately "swallowing up and engulfing the
whole law of public defamation," 118 it is apparent that two sep-
arate social interests are involved.
Further, an attempt has been made to set out the general
standards and terms which ought to be incorporated into the tort
law of privacy, in order to keep pace with changing social condi-
tions and attitudes. Many of the rules and procedures employed
by various courts and advanced by commentators will be able to
be carried over to this suggested clarification,119 subject to two
requirements: that they be consistent with the underlying so-
cial interest; and that they be flexible enough to grow with the
expanding concept they are to serve.
Thus, while the interest appears to have characteristics sim-
ilar to other protected legal interests, it must be understood that
"each is entitled to a liberty of choice as to his manner of life,
and neither an individual nor the public has a right to arbitrarily
take away from him his liberty.'1 20 With this concept in mind,
the courts may be able to avoid and cure the internal contradic-
tions which have plagued the acceptance, extension, and under-
standing of each person's right to privacy.
118. Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VA-D. L. Rnv.
1093, 1095 (1962).
119. The problem so far has been that many of these appropriate
procedures or rules are inaccurately applied because of failure to grasp
the right involved. With a proper understanding of these already estab-
lished rules, in addition to those suggested herein, an orderly solution
of this aspect of the problem should be readily available.
120. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 196, 50 S.E.
68, 70 (1905).
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